Quick-Look Report: USMC.2017.0005

Insights from the Marine Corps Organizational Culture Research Project: Rethinking Mentorship

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Marine Corps Organizational Culture (MCOCR) Project
Report Front Matter

The following seven pages of front matter provide background relevant to the report that may be of interest to some readers. This material accompanies all reports from the MCOCR Project posted in the Open Anthropology Research Repository. MCOCR reports were designed for an applied audience of military and civilian officials of the U.S. Marine Corps rather than a scholarly audience. Therefore some background information, such as research team composition and the incidents of social media harassment that led to the project, is assumed rather than explicit. Included in the front matter are:

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June 2020 (updated Sep 2022)

Project Overview

The Marine Corps Organizational Culture Research (MCOCR) Project was an exploratory research effort requested by the U.S. Marine Corps, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA), in July 2017 to gather information on Marine Corps culture. The project arose in part from concerns related to the Marines United social media misconduct (see page 4 of this document for more information) and also from longer-term leadership questions regarding shifts in Marine Corps culture. The research was conducted by the Translational Research Group (TRG) at Marine Corps University (MCU). [See pages 5-7 for more information on TRG.] The project was governed by Marine Corps Human Subjects Protection Protocol #USMC.2017.0005 and the provisions of academic freedom in MCU’s Academic Regulations. The Principal Investigator for the project was Dr. Kerry Fosher.

The intent of the project was to develop a broad, robust base of data and analyses related to Marine Corps culture that could be mined over the years to provide context and insights that could be used to inform problem-framing and decision-making on a range of issues and to complement/enhance other research methods, such as surveys. Additionally, the project was intended to support scholarly analysis and publication. The project was not intended to be representative of the entire Marine Corps or to support statistical analyses. As with most exploratory research, results were intended to inform discussion rather than make claims or advance particular positions regarding any Marine Corps program or policy. For additional information see the Frequently Asked Questions on page 3.

The first phase of MCOCR involved research design, data gathering, initial analysis, and production of two expedited reports. The research team collected data from Aug-Oct 2017 at installations in the United States and Japan, conducting 182 interviews and focus groups that were recorded and transcribed for analysis. Initial analysis focused on issues related to leadership, cohesion, and gender bias, captured in reports to the Marine Corps’ Personnel Studies and Oversight (PSO) Office, later renamed the Talent Management Oversight Directorate (TMOD).

A Quick Look Report on issues specifically related to the Marines United misconduct was delivered to PSO in February 2018. A broader initial Report to PSO was expedited and delivered on 30 March 2018. This report organized preliminary analysis into the following themes:

1. Marines United and the Prevalence of Online Misconduct
2. Challenges with and for Leadership
3. The Procedural and Social Uses of PFT/CFT Scores
4. Experiences of Female Marines
5. Hostile Environments
6. Remaining a Marine: How Enlisted and Officers Deliberate and Decide
7. Cohesion, Leadership, and Difference through the Lens of Humor

With the delivery of the initial report and associated materials to PSO, the Phase 1 of MCOCR was complete. This report is available on DTIC: AD1079774. Links to other project reports from Phase 2 are provided on the next page.

Initial release of this report was scheduled for May 2018. Release was delayed due to leadership questions about the applicability of MCU’s academic freedom policy. These questions were resolved in September 2019. The release resulted in media and Congressional attention. See additional information on page 4 of this document.

The second phase of MCOCR was intended to have three parts:

- Correct errors in the transcripts and removing protected information to develop them into a dataset that TRG could mine on a broad range of issues of interest to the Marine Corps.
- Conducting deeper and more structured analyses on issues of interest to the Marine Corps and topics of scholarly value.
- Continuing to advise Marine Corps organizations based on MCOCR and other datasets as requested.

The Marine Corps’ decision to close CAOCL and, consequently, disband TRG in June 2020 altered the plans and timelines for the second phase. Original analysis plans for Phase 2 also were disrupted by TRG’s inability to procure necessary analytic software and the delay associated with academic freedom questions. These factors significantly reduced the scope of analysis planned for Phase 2. See additional information below.
Marine Corps Organizational Culture Research
Phase 2

Advising
The TRG team continued to provide advice for problem framing and the development of more structured data gathering efforts to various Marine Corps organizations, including M&RA and TMOD until TRG was disbanded. Dr. Fosher continues to provide advice based on the project.

Dataset Development
Work to correct errors in the transcripts and remove protected information was completed in January 2020. This work ensured the transcripts could be analyzed accurately. It also allowed the transcripts to be placed in a repository for use by other researchers (see below).

Completed Analyses
Due to the limitations imposed by lack of software and impending closure, TRG focused on completing several "quick look" reports on different topics rather than the in-depth analyses originally planned. The following additional reports were completed and posted on DTIC:

- Insights from the MCOCR Project: Implicit and Explicit Perceptions of Fairness (DTIC AD1079415)
- Insights from the MCOCR Project: Pregnancy Loss (DTIC AD1085324)
- Insights from the MCOCR Project: Alcohol (DTIC AD1091445)
- Insights from the MCOCR Project: Rethinking Mentorship (DTIC AD1096699)
- Insights from the MCOCR Project: Trust in the Marine Corps – the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (DTIC AD1103134)
- Insights from the MCOCR Project: Sexual Assault and Harassment (DTIC AD1103136)
- Insights from the MCOCR Project: Empathy in Leadership (DTIC AD1102322)
- Insights from the MCOCR Project: Generational Differences in the Marine Corps – Exploring Issues and Frictions Between Older and Younger Marines (DTIC AD1102357)
- Insights from the MCOCR Project: Elements and Antidotes for Disillusionment (DTIC AD1102323)

All reports from the project were submitted to the Defense Technical Information Center for posting on the public portal. See also the section on data management below for additional locations and materials.

Scholarly Works
TRG team members presented on aspects of the MCOCR project at numerous academic conferences and in Marine Corps meetings. One scholarly article was published and another is in development as of this date:


Long-Term Data Management/ Data Availability for Future Research
Protection of the Marines who volunteered for the project and the data they provided was a priority for TRG. However, TRG also felt a responsibility to ensure that the data provided by Marines was used to the maximum extent possible. The principal investigator worked with the Marine Corps’ Human Research Protection Program to identify a data repository that balanced internal and external discoverability with necessary security. After reviewing several options, the Qualitative Data Repository (QDR) was selected. Versions of transcripts that have been scrubbed of protected information, along with project documentation and reports, were deposited in the QDR when CAOCL closed. They can be accessed at https://doi.org/10.5064/F6K4IVEP. Reports and other documentation are available to the public. Access to the transcripts requires an approved human subjects protection protocol that meets criteria specified in the project documentation. Reports also are being posted to the Open Anthropology Research Repository during September of 2022.

Some materials from the project, but not the data, also were included in the CAOCL collection provided to the Archives Branch of the Marine Corps History Division at MCU and reports were posted on DTIC. The original audio recordings, raw transcripts, and any materials that could link participants with the data were destroyed when TRG was closed.
What was MOCOR?
The MOCOR Project was a small, exploratory, qualitative research effort intended to gather U.S. Marine perspectives on a range of issues related to Marine Corps culture. The project resulted in 150 semi-structured interviews and 32 semi-structured focus groups with 267 unique participants (nine Marines participated in both an interview and a focus group). All participants were volunteers, and the project was conducted under a protocol approved by the Marine Corps Human Research Protection Program. The project was conducted by the Translational Research Group (TRG) at the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) under Marine Corps University’s (MCU) academic freedom policy.

How should the information in MOCOR reports be used?
Because of the non-representative sample, data and analysis from MOCOR were intended to inform discussions in conjunction with other information sources. They should not be used to make broad, statistical claims about Marines or Marine Corps programs and policies.

Were Marine statements fact-checked?
No. The intent of the project was to gather Marine perspectives without regard to whether the perspectives were based on full knowledge of current Marine Corps policies and programs. In some cases, it was important to capture misperceptions, as they had implications for internal Marine Corps messaging.

What are the project’s limitations?
1. The MOCOR sample was not designed to be representative of the Marine Corps population in terms of sex, race/ethnicity, MOS, or other characteristics. Therefore, the data cannot be used in statistical analysis designed to make claims about all Marines. Sample demographics are included in the March 2018 report from the project, available on DTIC (AD1079774).
2. The project did not include Marines in the reserves or recently retired/ separated Marines due to Marine Corps interpretation of DoD policy on information collections at the time the research was designed.
3. The project’s designers did not actively seek volunteers above E-8 and O-5; therefore, senior voices are not strong in the sample.

Who funded and sponsored the project?
The project fell within the normal scope of work of TRG and the majority of the project was funded out of CAOCL’s existing budget. Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) requested that the research be done, but the research design, conduct, and analysis were controlled by TRG. M&RA assisted with logistics, travel for research team members who were not part of TRG, and funding to accelerate transcription of audio recordings.

When and where were data gathered?
Between August and October 2017, the research team gathered data at the following locations: Pentagon, Marine Corps Base (MCB) Quantico, VA, MCB Camp Lejeune, NC, Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Cherry Point, NC, MCB Camp Pendleton, CA, Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center 29 Palms, CA, MCAS Yuma, AZ, and MCB Camp Butler, Okinawa, Japan.

Can Marines who participated be identified?
Identification is unlikely. Marines who volunteered for the research went through an informed consent process that warned them of the risks and the steps the research team would take to mitigate them. (A copy of the informed consent information is available in the project documentation through the Archives Branch of the Marine Corps History Division at MCU or the Qualitative Data Repository at Syracuse University.) Names were removed from the dataset and other measures were taken to mask identities, but Marines were cautioned prior to agreeing to participate in an interview or focus group, during the informed consent process, that it might still be possible for some readers to identify them through their habits of speech and/or combinations of characteristics, such as MOS and location.

What were the qualifications and characteristics of the research team?
The principal investigator was a cultural anthropologist with more than 20 years of experience working with and doing research on national security organizations, including 10 years leading research teams on projects focused on the Marine Corps. The composition of the MOCOR research team changed between 2017 and 2020, but team members possessed PhDs or MAs in the following disciplines: cultural anthropology, sociology, cultural geography, international relations, education, communication, and evaluation science. Additionally, the project’s design was peer reviewed by a DoD scientist with a PhD in psychology. Data gathering teams included male and female researchers. To the maximum extent possible, participants were allowed to choose the sex of the researcher with whom they interacted. All team members were caucasian. The data gathering team included two members with Marine backgrounds. One was a recently retired field-grade Marine officer, and the other was an active duty, company-grade Marine officer. The research team also consulted with other social and behavioral scientists and Marines during design and analysis.

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Timeline and Background:

The initial MCOCR report was delivered to the Marine Corps on 30 Mar 2018. The Translational Research Group's (TRG) original agreement to conduct the project included public release of all outcomes under Marine Corps University’s (MCU) academic freedom policy. However, release of project outcomes was delayed for 17 months due to Marine Corps leadership questions about the applicability of academic freedom policy to the project. After materials were released in September 2019, they received light attention in the media and Congress, examples of which are provided below.

Briefs to Congressional Staff

A team including the MCOCR Project's Principal Investigator, Dr. Kerry Fosher, BGen Daniel Shipley, then Director of Manpower Plans and Policies, and Dr Michael Strobl, then Deputy Director of Manpower Plans and Policies, briefed Military Legislative Assistants from the Senate on 07 February 2020 and from the House on 04 March 2020. BGen Robert Fulford, Legislative Assistant to the Commandant, and staff from the Office of Legislative Affairs also participated in the brief to Senate Military Legislative Assistants. (The brief to House staffers was truncated due to growing concerns over the COVID19 pandemic, which was emerging at that time.)

Media Coverage

To our knowledge, no major news outlets covered the MCOCR project. It received some attention on social media sites such as LinkedIn, Twitter, and Facebook in both military- and social science-related channels. It also was covered by some military-focused media outlets. Two examples of coverage are:

• Szoldra, Paul. 2019. An internal investigation spurred by a nude photo scandal shows just how deep sexism runs in the Marine Corps. Task and Purpose. 04 Dec.


Congressional Hearing

To our knowledge, the MCOCR Project was discussed in only one public hearing. In the 10 Dec 2019 hearing, LtGen Michael Rocco, Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, the sub-committee chair, Rep Jackie Speier, and Rep Susan Davis, briefly discussed the Marine Corps’ handling of the report, challenges with Marine Corps culture, concepts of equity and parity, and the importance of empathy in the professional development of Marines.

• U.S. House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Military Personnel Hearing, “Diversity in Recruiting and Retention: Increasing Diversity in the Military – What the Military Services are Doing.” Dec 10, 2019. The project is discussed or mentioned at:
  o 1:16:40 (LtGen Rocco briefly mentions the MCOCR initial report in his testimony)
  o 1:18:21 (Rep Speier and LtGen Rocco discuss the delayed release of the initial report and some aspects of its contents)
  o 1:31:08 (LtGen Rocco, responding to Rep Susan Davis, raises the report in his remarks on teaching empathy).

Marines United Background

In early March of 2017, The War Horse and Reveal from the Center for Investigative Reporting published a piece on a Facebook group called Marines United (See Thomas James Brennan, 4 Mar 2017). Members of the group had created linked Google Drive folders and posted photographs of women—some naked, some clothed—as well as personally identifying information and hostile comments about women. Some of the women targeted were Marines. At the time of the reporters’ investigation, the Facebook group had over 30,000 members, some of whom were later determined to be active duty Marines. The investigations in the year following the initial news coverage identified 97 Marines as possible culprits. There were a range of punishments according to reporting in The Marine Corps Times (See Shawn Snow 21 Mar 2018). A brief overview of the legal actions taken was provided in a 2018 article in Military.com (See Hope Hodge Seck 13 Sep 2018). Although there were other signs of hostile behavior and social media-based misconduct that concerned the Marine Corps, the media attention and congressional scrutiny surrounding Marines United meant that it served as the primary frame for much of the subsequent discussion and action by the Marine Corps. Those actions included the formation of a task force and launching a number of initiatives. These efforts are not well documented in public Marine Corps reports, but news coverage and congressional testimony can be found via internet and library searches.
Translational Research Group
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Timeline and Background:

**General Background:** The Translational Research Group (TRG) was a multi-disciplinary group of social scientists that operated from 2010 to 2020. The group was located within the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), which was responsible for providing culture-related, regional, and language education and training to the U.S. Marine Corps. Originally part of the Training and Education Command headquarters, CAOCL was reorganized and became part of Marine Corps University in 2012.

The idea for the group grew out of discussions between the anthropologist who became its director and Marine Corps leaders, one of whom was the Director of CAOCL. They had seen many problems in the Marine Corps’ ability to leverage research results and scientific expertise. Many problems seemed to arise from the lack of persistent presence of scientific researchers in the Marine Corps’ supporting establishment. Sometimes, researchers lacked sufficient understanding of the military and its context to design effective and useful research. Sometimes military leaders did not have enough experience with scientists to know how to interact with them and how to frame questions to ensure results were usable. Often, the long lag time between completion of a research project and implementation of results meant that researchers were no longer available when the Marine Corps had questions about how to use the knowledge developed through a research effort. Having researchers on site and employed full time, rather than on a project-by-project basis, was intended to help mitigate some of these problems.

In addition to attempting to work on the challenges above, TRG also was an experiment in the interaction of the social sciences with the military. It was formed at a time when tensions were very high between social science professional associations and military organizations. The tension was a renewal of mutual mistrust that emerged during and after past periods of engagement, most notably in World War II and the 1960s and 70s. As a result of these tensions, the resulting lack of familiarity on both sides, and unrelated changes in the civilian personnel system, most military organizations became undesirable employment options for social scientists who wanted to maintain their professional identities. Even setting aside the problems working with the military could cause in academic professional circles, the working conditions were not appropriate for retaining expertise. Job duties as civil servants or contractors did not include time for maintaining and advancing professional knowledge and networks, there was little support for publication, attending conferences, and other normal scientific work, and there were very few career tracks that allowed a scientist to advance while maintaining a scientific identity rather than becoming a rank-and-file manager. These conditions were mitigated to some degree for those working in military colleges and universities, but even in those settings, support for professional development was limited and research involving fieldwork was not easily accommodated. Taking a civil service or contract job supporting a military organization was, too often, a professional death sentence. TRG attempted, with a mix of success and failure, to address these problems by creating an environment that provided military officials with access to social science expertise, but also established more viable working conditions.

TRG drew its name and general orientation from the concept of translational research in medicine and other sciences, which emphasizes the ability to move knowledge from research to application quickly through increased communication between researchers and practitioners and by other means. The translational research concept in TRG differed somewhat from applied research in the military context because it included basic or foundational research. It emphasized continued scientific rigor and researcher control over design and execution with increased attention to the questions, ideas, and needs of potential end users and greater awareness of the implementation context.

**People:** The director of TRG, Dr. Kerry Fosher, was a civil servant at the GS-14 level whose PhD was in cultural anthropology. Although the original intent was to create government positions for the researchers, it was never possible to accomplish that goal and the group was staffed with full time contractors. Another aspect of the original intent was to focus recruitment on people from the fieldwork-focused social sciences, such as anthropology, geography, sociology, and similar fields at the PhD level. Hiring into civil service or contract positions is never a simple process and at no time was TRG completely staffed as intended. At various points, TRG had researchers with MAs or PhDs in disciplines including cultural anthropology, cultural geography, education, educational psychology, international relations, international studies, biological anthropology, and cognitive psychology. It also developed close collaborative relationships with several other researchers with backgrounds in sociology, social psychology, inter-cultural communication, and other disciplines, as well as collaborative relationships with military personnel from a wide range of backgrounds. Although the range of disciplines was not what was intended, researchers with different degree backgrounds brought other capabilities that turned out to be highly valuable. The number of researchers in the group varied over the years based on CAOCL’s funding and the details of contracts, but averaged six researchers, not including the director.

**Resources:** TRG was funded out of CAOCL’s budget rather than on a project-by-project basis, although it did occasionally take supplemental funding to enhance staffing or support requirements for particular projects. This approach to funding ensured that researchers would persist in the context, enabling them to advise on implementation of research results and other aspects of the selection and use of science. Funding the group in this way also had downsides. CAOCL had to focus on its core mission to provide education and training, which sometimes led to...
Functions: Although TRG’s areas of emphasis changed somewhat over the course of the 10 years it existed, most of its work fell into three categories:

- research, advising, and outreach
- support to CAOCL
- assessment.

Research, Advising, and Outreach
TRG did not accept tasks in the way many research entities working with or within the military did during this time period. Project ideas might come from researchers, Marines, or other Marine Corps organizations. However, selection of projects was at the discretion of TRG’s director, with approval by CAOCL’s director. The intent was to ensure that the group conducted projects within its available range of expertise and resources and only on questions that the team found valid rather than having to respond to requests that might not have been a good fit with the group’s capabilities or that would have challenged its integrity. This level of autonomy was highly unusual in DoD and frequently challenged, but necessary for the group to function as designed. Most research efforts focused on issues related to Marines and Marine Corps organizations such as stress and resilience, gender bias, humanitarian assistance missions, and cultural patterns in the Marine Corps. Projects leveraged the strengths of the team at any given time, but emphasized field research, including observation, semi-structured interviews, and semi-structured focus groups. A core strength of TRG was to bring Marine voices into discussions largely dominated by survey research and other quantified data.

The group provided a great deal of scientific advising to the Marine Corps and other DoD organizations. Originally envisioned as work that would focus on implementation of results, this line of activity expanded and became one of the most valuable aspects of TRG’s work. Rather than focusing exclusively on implementation of its own results, TRG researchers also came to be valued for the advice they could provide based on their existing expertise, helping Marine Corps leaders scope problems, design research approaches, and evaluate research claims from other projects. Advisory conversations did not usually result in artifacts like reports or publications but rather in improved decision-making. However, it was one of the most valuable services TRG researchers provided.

Researchers also engaged in outreach through presenting work to scholarly and practitioner audiences, teaching guest classes and electives within Marine Corps University and elsewhere, publishing, and becoming involved in the professional associations of their disciplines. This outreach helped inform academic audiences about military personnel and served to improve relations between the military, academic social scientists, and scientific professional associations.

Support to CAOCL
TRG supported CAOCL’s education, training, and policy sections in a variety of ways. Researchers reviewed and wrote inputs on doctrine and policy, advised on approaches to assessment, and occasionally supported training sessions with instruction. However, the most significant support it provided was in the area of culture general curricula, which provided Marines with the concepts and skills needed to operate effectively when they do not have sufficient/current culture-specific information. Although CAOCL had adopted the 5 dimensions model in 2009 (see Operational Culture for the Warrior by Salmoni and Holmes Eber, 2008 and 2011), it was primarily used as a means of organizing regional or culture-specific material. The generalizable concepts and skills were not an integral part of curricula. For the first 5 years of its existence, TRG led the effort to integrate culture general material, first in CAOCL’s distance education program and later in its training program. This work sometimes involved developing curricula or reference materials and at other times focused on advising CAOCL’s sections about what should be included. Once the Professor of Military Cross-Cultural Competence (PM3C) was hired to be part of CAOCL and a member of the university’s faculty, TRG was able to transition leadership of these efforts to her with TRG researchers supporting her efforts.

Assessment
TRG’s director led CAOCL’s assessment platform and TRG researchers worked with CAOCL’s sections to help them design assessment approaches that would support required reporting and answer the more complex questions asked by CAOCL’s director. One TRG researcher was responsible for collating annual information from the sections and using it to support various reporting requirements. TRG researchers also conducted assessment research, several examples of which are available on the Defense Technical Information Center’s public portal.

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Translational Research Group
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Balance of Functions: This arrangement of tasks could be seen as a distraction from the core work of conducting research and advising or as simply “paying rent” to TRG’s host organization, CAOCL. At times it was, but it also served a purpose. There was a reciprocal relationship between the work on training and education programs and the group’s research. The support to CAOCL’s sections and assessment work brought researchers into contact with the active duty and retired Marines in CAOCL and into discussions about Marines and the Marine Corps. In some cases, this work was a researcher’s first introduction to the Marine Corps and a useful orientation before engaging in research-related activities. It also kept the researchers tied to the sometimes-frustrating realities of trying to get science integrated in the supporting establishment, something that was an important background for science advising. In turn, the group’s research projects not only served their intended purposes, but also helped researchers develop greater knowledge of Marines and their missions, which informed their work on training and education.

Additionally, the arrangement ensured that the Marine Corps got full value from a relatively scarce commodity, fieldwork-focused social scientists. For the reasons noted above, during this time period, it was not easy to get qualified social scientists to work with the military and those employed purely in education and training sometimes struggled to maintain their professional standing or do research. TRG provided a mechanism that allowed social scientists to support education and training without losing their ability to conduct research, publish, and stay connected to their fields.

Closure: In 2019, the Marine Corps began substantial reorganizations and program cuts (referred to as divestment) in an effort to align its funding and personnel with the capabilities it believed would be necessary in future conflicts. These changes were difficult and controversial. For example, the service divested tanks, something that would have been unthinkable previously. Culture and language programs also were divested. CAOCL closed its doors on 30 Jun 2020 and, consequently, TRG was disbanded. Marine Corps University retained TRG’s director as the university-level director of research and CAOCL’s culture-focused faculty member who continued to teach across the university. Initially, a few of CAOCL’s education and training capabilities were retained in the newly formed Center for Regional and Security Studies (CRSS). However, in the two years following CAOCL’s closure, the CRSS lost staffing and funding. As of September 2022, CRSS has no dedicated funding and is staffers by one Marine officer who will not be replaced when his assignment changes, making it unlikely that the center will continue unless Marine Corps priorities change.

Of note, the other U.S. services underwent similar reductions or shifts in their culture and language capabilities during the same time period. (See *The Rise and Decline of U.S. Military Culture Programs 2004-20* Fosher and Mackenzie, eds and *The Best-Laid Schemes: A Tale of Social Research and Bureaucracy* Deitchman. Both are available to the public via Marine Corps University Press.) These shifts corresponded with a number of fieldwork-focused social scientists from across the services, including TRG, leaving through retirement or transitioning to work in academia or the private sector.

Archives and Repositories: TRG has archived its materials in a number of places. The specific contents of each collection were tailored to the archive or repository:

**Marine Corps History Division Archives Branch:** The CAOCL Collection deposited in this archive includes materials from TRG. Materials include reports and publications, project overviews and summaries, assessment reports, and similar artifacts.

**Defense Technical Information Center:** TRG posted many of its research and assessment reports on DTIC. Most can be located by searching on Fosher or CAOCL.

**Qualitative Data Repository:** TRG deposited materials and data from four projects in the QDR. Reports, project overviews, IRB-related materials, and some data from the projects are available to the public by searching for Fosher. Access to data from two of the projects requires an IRB-approved protocol.

Marine Corps University Human Subjects Research Archive: All IRB records from TRG’s projects are retained in the university’s centralized storage. These records are accessible only to IRB-approved personnel.

**Open Anthropology Research Repository:** Starting in September 2022, a selection of reports from TRG is being deposited in the OARR.

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Executive Summary

The Marine Corps and its Marines practice mentorship in a way that is closely aligned with leadership. Specifically, mentorship is often conceptualized, both in organizational publications and by Marines themselves, as an intra-unit endeavor and as something that senior-ranking Marines do to junior-ranking Marines. This “unit-hierarchy” model of mentorship has served many Marines well, but, according to Marines in our study, it has some significant blind spots. This report discusses those blind spots and addresses choice as an important element of the mentor-mentee relationship. We suggest that promoting mentorship choices outside of the unit and chain of command may provide Marines with maximum mentorship potential. We provide examples of how some Marines have cultivated beneficial mentoring relationships outside of their command, highlighting how this choice is particularly vital for women. The main themes of this report are:

1. Many of the problems Marines talk about with leadership can be said of mentorship within the unit-hierarchy mentorship model. While leadership is confined necessarily to the unit, mentorship does not have to be. For Marines with weak or uninterested leaders, finding a mentor outside of the chain of command might alleviate some of the personal and professional ramifications of poor unit leadership.

2. An alignment of values between mentor and mentee is a big factor in mentorship choices. For a Marine to find a mentor within the unit whose values and/or experiences they share may be difficult for certain minority individuals.

3. Bias of any sort within a unit can deprive certain individuals and groups of healthy mentoring relationships. This is a reason why minority populations, such as female Marines, may benefit from seeking mentorship outside of the bounds of the unit.

4. Reverse mentorship (which is when an individual with less status mentors someone with more status) is sanctioned between senior enlisted and junior officers. However, other forms of reverse mentorship seem to be looked down upon, even when an individual has valuable experience to share with those who outrank him or her.

5. Personality is a big factor in finding a mentor. Not all will mesh with those in their units, and so opening the aperture of mentorship beyond the unit will possibly increase successful mentoring relationships.

6. For female Marines, choice of mentor is complex but particularly essential. Women’s challenges in both finding and being mentors illustrate why choice outside the chain of command is important. These challenges include:
   a. Although there is an expectation within the Corps that women are the best mentors for other women, this is not always the case.
      i. Shared sex does not equate with shared experience or personality alignment.
      ii. Some women are hesitant to mentor other women for various reason, including:
         1. Some women have mixed feelings about encouraging the career of women in the Corps when they themselves have had bad experiences in the organization.
2. Some women do not want to mentor or be mentored by other women for fear that reputation is contagious, i.e., they will get labelled with the negative stereotype of their mentor or mentee.

b. The assumption that women should mentor other women has organizational and personal impacts when women are extracted from and added to military occupational specialties (MOSs) for the purpose of creating "safe landing zones" for women in certain MOSs.

c. Some men are hesitant to mentor women. This stems from the fear, rampant in the Corps, that women are likely to falsely accuse men of misconduct and/or somehow get men into trouble. Another factor might be that men do not perceive themselves to be capable of mentoring women, citing biological and personality differences.

d. Women tend to be more scrutinized across the Marine Corps, and even more so when they become mothers. Female participants appreciated seeing Marine mothers in leadership roles, even if they were not in the same unit.

CAVEAT: This report was produced in response to a leadership request to examine data from the Marine Corps Organizational Culture Research Project to identify themes in Marine perspectives related to mentorship. Due to the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning's impending closure, the research team did not have time to fully investigate Marine Corps policies and programs related to mentorship or conduct new research focused on the topic in order to contextualize the perspectives Marines provided. The material presented here is, therefore, a quick look at mentorship in the dataset and should be used in combination with other analyses.

Introduction

"You can't assign a mentor, but that's what the Marine Corps, in its bureaucracy-minded approach, does!"¹

- Major² at MCAGCC Twentynine Palms

Marines often conflate mentoring with leadership. Because the Marine Corps has a rank-and unit-defined understanding of leadership, this is, by and large, also the model for mentorship – what we will call the “unit-hierarchy” model or paradigm of mentorship in this paper. Many Marines have benefitted from excellent mentorship from within their chain of command, but others struggle to find mentorship therein. This could be due to weak unit leadership, biased leadership, or a combination of factors. It could also be because mentors are expected to play so many roles. As

¹This major was referring to the Marine Corps Mentoring Program (MCMP). An extended version of his thoughts are as follows: "I know that when I talk about mentorship, the Marine Corps has a mentorship program where you have a folder! And you have forms that you fill out! [in mocking authoritative voice] The mentor, the mentee, and the things to improve on! And the good things. And every month you're supposed to sit down and, 'Okay, I'm your mentor. I'm assigned this.' You can't assign a mentor, but that's what the Marine Corps, in its bureaucracy-minded approach does! Uh, 'This sergeant is the mentor for these Marines, [tapping sound on table] and this corporal is the mentor for these Marines...'" This research took place right after the MCMP was cancelled, but the major did not appear to know about the development.

²Major (#126), Male, Interview, MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, 091917.
stated in the Marine Corps Mentoring Program\(^3\) (MCMP) Guidebook,\(^4\) “at any one time, a mentor could be a teacher, guide, counselor, motivator, sponsor, coach, advisor, referral agent, or role model” (p. 11). However, someone who excels at career guidance, for instance, might not be adept at counseling over family issues. For these reasons, choice – more specifically, the option to choose a mentor within or outside of one’s chain of command – appears to be a factor in successful mentoring relationships, according to Marines interviewed for the Marine Corps Organizational Culture Research (MCOCR) Project.

The data presented here point to limitations of the culturally “prescribed” mentor-mentee dyads inherent within the unit-hierarchy mentorship model (unit leader to unit subordinate, senior to junior, female to female), which appear not to serve some Marines as well as others. Like the Major quoted above expressed, the Marine Corps tends to “assign” mentors. Our data indicate that mentors and mentees are paired up according to rank, unit, and sex. This happens both formally – such as through mentorship programs – and informally – such as through the assumption that a mentor and mentee should be of the same sex. As this report details, women seem to be especially at risk for lacking quality mentorship within the confines of the unity-hierarchy paradigm. Most of the Marine mentees whose mentors were outside of the unit hierarchy described positive relationships, and their examples provide insights into why decoupling the mentorship from leadership and promoting choice more broadly might be advantageous. *Please note, while this report focuses on identity factors pertaining to sex and how they relate to mentorship (a relationship that was clearly present in our data), a more focused and in-depth analysis would be needed to analyze how other identity factors, such as ethnicity, relate to mentorship experiences.*

**The Marine Corps Organizational Culture Research Project**

The Translational Research Group\(^5\) (TRG) initiated the MCOCR Project\(^6\) as part of the Marine Corps’ response to the March 2017 Marines United Facebook misconduct.\(^7\) The research was an exploratory endeavor designed to capture Marines’ perceptions of leadership, cohesion, and...

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3 The MCMP Guidebook states that the mission of the MCMP is “to provide another leadership tool to guide you on the road to successful leadership and the ‘developing’ of Marines. The mentoring program is formal, in that research, resources and manpower were used to develop and implement the concepts throughout the Marine Corps. The mentorship program is not designed to preclude on-the-spot counseling, immediate corrective action, or formal disciplinary actions when appropriate.” In talking to Marines for this project, there was no evidence that the MCMP was universally applied nor that the MCMP Guidebook and the roadmap it provides for cultivating mentor-mentee relationships were widely known or utilized. The same can be said of the MCMP’s replacement, the Marine Leader Development (MLD) framework.

4 The MCMP Guidebook was published in 2006 and can be found here: [https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/NAVMC%20DIR%201500.58.pdf](https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/NAVMC%20DIR%201500.58.pdf).

5 The Translational Research Group is situated within Marine Corps University’s Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning. TRG is a small interdisciplinary social science research team that, at the time of the MCOCR Project, consisted of academics from the fields of anthropology, sociology, international policy studies, geography, education studies, and evaluation sciences.

6 The Office of Manpower and Reserve Affairs requested that TRG conduct this research. For more information on how the project unfolded, please see Fosher, Kerry, Lane, Rebecca; Tarzi, Erika; Post, Kristin; Gauldin, Eric; Edwards, Jennifer, and McLean, Jeremy. (2020). Translational Research in a Military Organization: The Marine Corps Organizational Culture Research Project. *Annals of Anthropological Practice*, published online 22 February 2020: volume and issue forthcoming. [https://doi.org/10.1111/napa.12130](https://doi.org/10.1111/napa.12130).

7 The Marines United Facebook misconduct involved members of a private Facebook page posting nude pictures of female Marines and making disparaging, crude, and violent comments about them. Members of this Facebook page included active-duty Marines and retired Marines as well as members (active-duty and retired) of other services.
gender bias to provide insight into why something like the Marines United misconduct might occur. TRG collected data from August until October of 2017 in the national capital region and at Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Lejeune, Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Cherry Point, MCB Camp Pendleton, Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) Twentynine Palms, MCAS Yuma, and MCB Camp Butler in Okinawa, Japan. In total, TRG conducted 150 interviews and 32 focus groups with 267 unique participants. Interviews and focus groups lasted between half an hour and two hours and were semi-structured in design to allow Marines to introduce topics that had not been apparent at the outset of the project. Mentoring is one such topic that arose in conversations with the participants. In this report we take a very broad view of mentorship. This reflects the views of our participants, who also described mentorship in a diverse manner. Participants referenced mentoring in relation to leadership, counseling, career progression, on-the-job knowledge, problem-solving, giving and seeking advice, role models, and navigating personal affairs.

A Note on Organizational Conceptualizations of Mentorship

This report sometimes refers to conceptualizations of mentorship within organizational programs, orders, and literature; the purpose of this is to situate individual understandings of mentorship within organizational ethos. However, the main focus of this report is Marines’ perspectives and experiences surrounding mentorship as opposed to organizational conceptualizations. Our data indicate that Marines often have limited knowledge of large scale policies and programs. Further, the bearing that mentorship-related programs and orders has on the everyday lives of Marines cannot be determined from our research, as we did not specifically ask about it.

The Marine Corps Mentoring Program was officially cancelled in July of 2017 and replaced with the Marine Leader Development (MLD) framework. The research from which this report draws its data was conducted shortly thereafter, in August, September, and October of 2017. The MLD’s conceptualization of mentorship is more in line with what this report recommends, stating, “Mentoring is a voluntary relationship between two individuals and should not be directed or forced.” Although the MLD’s conceptualization of mentorship is not a rigid as what we as the unit-hierarchy model, the unit-hierarchy model still exists heavily in other organizational publications, including Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 – Warfighting and Marine Corps Reference Publication 6-11D – Sustaining the Transformation. This is also the mentorship guidance found in the MCMP Guidebook, which states that the mentoring program “is designed to follow the chain of command relationship, so that each leader is responsible for mentoring his/her subordinates” (p. 12). To the best of our knowledge, the Marine Corps seems to provide mentorship tools and guidance for leaders, but no strict oversight is imposed. Nonetheless, we do refer to organizational understandings of mentorship in order to compare and contrast them with the lived realities of Marines.

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8 The MLD website states explicitly that MLD is a framework: “[MLD] is neither a philosophy nor a program; rather, it is a framework to be used by Marines at all levels for themselves and subordinates.”

9 From page 5 of MCO 1500.61, which can be found here: https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/MCO%201500_61%20Marine%20Leader%20Development_1.pdf
Issues within the Unit-Hierarchy Model

In our data, Marines frequently described mentorship as paralleling leadership’s emphasis on pushing down guidance through a structured chain of command. For instance, a 1st lieutenant in our study said, “You are in charge of your platoons. You need to mentor your squad leaders. Squad leaders, you are in charge of your squad. You must mentor your fire team leaders. Fire team leaders, you’re in charge of your fire team.” As with this infantry-based example, all Marine units break into smaller groups where the senior ranking Marine is expected to lead and mold the junior ranks. While a good leader may be a good mentor, leadership failures inside the unit can decrease the capacity for good mentorship within the unit-hierarchy model.

Role models: Value alignment in mentorship

Many Marines in our sample equated mentors with role models, typically talking about Marines whose behavior they observed and emulated. However, some also made the distinction between “bad” role models and “good” role models. A gunnery sergeant addressed how he actually learns from both:

It’s hard to describe mentoring. There are leaders that help me because I observe them doing the right thing. To me that’s the way I learn, seeing somebody and saying, pardon my French, but “that guy’s a dick, and he’s only doing that because he’s a gunny and he’s a staff sergeant.” ... So, yeah, there are people that I observed that were positive influences, and there are people that I observed that were negative influences.

A 1st lieutenant also distinguished positive influences from the negative influences. She articulated how advice was given to her by a mentor who might have been well-meaning but whose values (e.g., “taking care of yourself”) did not align with the lieutenant’s values (“protecting the institution”):

So, I have some phenomenal senior mentorship, and then I’ve had mentorship that’s literally pulled me to the side and said, “Hey, you’re not going to survive if you don’t start throwing people under the bus or if you don’t start taking care of yourself. You’ve got to protect yourself at all costs,” and that, to me, I’m kind of seen as stubborn or pig-headed sometimes just because I’m the type of person that says, “No, I don’t have to agree with you. I think your advice is kind of shitty, and I don’t believe that that is what the organization stands for, and if you’re protecting yourself, you’re not protecting the institution.”

Both the sergeant and lieutenant illustrated the importance of value alignment in mentorship. While Marines are ideally instilled with common Marine Corps values during their initial training, the reality of the human experience means that not all who join the fleet will unerringly adhere to those values, or that individuals will express those values in coherent and consistent ways. Many of the Marines to whom we spoke reported having experienced or enacted poor leadership (see “Those who can’t lead...also can’t mentor” below). The option to go outside of the unit to find a

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10 1st Lieutenant (#516), Male, Officer Focus Group, MCAS Yuma, 092517.
11 Gunnery Sergeant (#038), Male, Interview, MCB Camp Lejeune, 082317.
12 1st Lieutenant (#045), Female, Interview, MCB Camp Lejeune, 082317.
mentor might mitigate experiences in which a Marine gets frustrated because their leadership does not seem to espouse or enact values that align with their own. It might also allow young Marines who are new to the fleet to see and experience various types of mentorship and leadership, as opposed to having just one template to follow. In effect, it might give them a “Plan B” should their unit leadership fail them.

Those who can’t lead...also can’t mentor

Because leadership and mentorship are so intertwined in the Marine Corps, many of the problems Marine participants associated with leadership also arose in discussions of mentorship. Many Marines learned how to lead through the examples set by their leaders. But how effective is this model if a Marine has never witnessed good leadership? A major\(^{13}\) said this was especially a problem for junior enlisted:

> So when you’re a junior enlisted leader, corporal or whatever, you haven’t had intensive leadership type mentoring and training, most of the mentoring part from a quality leader, an actual mentor, you default to what you’ve always known. And what do we all know? We all know the Drill Instructor yelling. So, um, we end up thinking, especially the guys at MCT\(^{14}\), SOI\(^{15}\), and entry level schools, the lance corporals, corporals, and sergeants who are in charge of herding the students along [snaps finger], “Do this thing,” right?

One senior staff non-commissioned officer\(^{16}\) (SNCO) admitted she had been a poor leader and mentor because she mimicked the outbursts she observed with her drill instructors, which were not getting results.

> As a staff sergeant, I think that was my biggest learning curve because I would yell at people for no reason. Just because I was a staff sergeant and I could just yell at people. I could be, you know, yelling, yelling, yelling, and absolutely zero [chuckles] effect. So, even though that sounds super hypocritical – and it absolutely is – because those were the things I despised from my drill instructor, I did it. And it’s a learned behavior through the culture.

Likewise, a captain\(^{17}\) described how ineffective yelling can be for junior Marines in need of development, especially when shouting is accompanied by a lack of follow-up for either the Marine or the leader:

> You get those guys that kind of get lazy with that and just leave it as a verbal, like, “Hey, fix yourself.” You know, obviously, probably more politically incorrect than that. But they’re gonna leave it at that and not do any paperwork. If they’ve had to correct you five times, they’re just gonna yell louder the next time. So, it does take some paperwork. I mean, it’s a bureaucracy. So, we’ve gotta take the bureaucratic steps. So, a lot of times that’s where people get themselves in trouble. Since we have so much turn over in leadership, you set the next guy up for failure ‘cause it’s like, “Yeah, these guys all suck at doing their job. They suck as Marines.”

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\(^{13}\) Major (#126), Male, Interview, MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, 091917.

\(^{14}\) Marine Combat Training

\(^{15}\) School of Infantry

\(^{16}\) Rank Withheld (#263), Female, Interview, MCB Camp Butler, 101717.

\(^{17}\) Captain (#016), Male, Interview, MCB Camp Lejeune, 082217.
In the senior SNCO's personal account of bad leadership and the captain's perspective of the wide-ranging impacts of bad leadership, it is evident that a lack of positive role models plays a role, and that bad leadership is infectious. However, unlike infectious disease, the best course of action for bad leadership is to un-quarantine mentorship from the confines of the unit. Marines who have greater exposure to other leaders and mentors will have a smaller risk of passing on bad leadership to others.

**Biased leadership and nowhere else to go**

It was evident from the data that unit leadership may disregard subordinates because of a specific bias. The following story is emblematic of this phenomenon. It describes how a junior enlisted Marine encountered bias and poor leadership, which negatively affected her ability to do her job as well as her professional reputation.

This lance corporal first entered the fleet six months prior to our interview. Her unit soon came under investigation for hazing that she herself experienced, although she was so new that, "I didn’t even know at the time when we got hazed that it was hazing until someone from another building across from us recorded it and posted it on Facebook." She exhibited little emotion when recounting this incident but became visibly and audibly emotional when she described the disrespect she experienced while trying to learn and perform well in her job. She described one incident where she and her roommate were sent on a run to pick up a heavy metal container known as a quadcon.

And we asked, "Do we need like chains and binds, like do we need anything?" And they said, "No. Just click it in and go. Like it should be fine. It should fit." Well, we got there, and it didn’t fit. Like it only- it’s supposed to have three-point contact, and there was only two.

As the lance corporal and her roommate realized they needed additional equipment, they received a text from a friend in their unit asking if everything was all right. The friend relayed the conversation he overheard in the office. The lance corporal recounted this, saying:

Well, a lot of people over here are talking about your run right now. And like, somebody asked like, “Who the fuck these girls are?” And then one of your NCOs said, “Those wooks are mine.” So, we’re just wondering like what’s going on with you all?

The use of the word “girls” and “wooks” perhaps indicates that their perceived ineptitude was in some way tied to their sex. The lance corporal admitted that she was “clueless” about her job, as many junior Marines are when they first hit the fleet, but that she was eager to learn more. The quadcon assignment was her first chance to prove herself and, according to her, was also her last. The lance corporal continued with frustration in her voice, "No matter how hard I tried- all I did was I try to work. And they [NCOs in her unit] don’t really see my accomplishments. They see all my little mistakes. And it’s just like- I just get like mad anxiety now.” With three more years ahead of her, and few positive experiences thus far in her career, this junior Marine’s helplessness about who could be trusted in her unit and how to learn her job was palpable.

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18 Lance Corporal (#624), Female, Interview, MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, 091917.
19 Non-Commissioned Officer
20 "Wooks," short for Wookie, a fictional species in Star Wars. It is a derogatory term used for female Marines.
Although bad leadership was a big topic of conversation in our interviews and focus groups, because of the exploratory nature of this research, we make no claims to how frequent this type of leadership is in the Marine Corps. It is obvious, though, that if a pattern of poor or biased leadership does exist, it is possible that Marines in that unit, especially those who are new to the fleet, will struggle to succeed in their professional roles. Biased leadership is a substantial problem that is beyond the scope of this paper, but its impact on mentorship might be alleviated if Marines did not perceive their units as the only place where they can seek mentorship relationships. Granted, in the case of the lance corporal above, her unit was the prime spot to find the career mentorship that she needed. However, had she had any other type of support or mentorship outside of her unit, she might not be so disenchanted with the Corps only six months into her enlistment. Although the lance corporal did not talk about whether or not she would reenlist, it is not likely too far a stretch to say that good mentorship is conducive to force retention, while a lack of mentorship is not.

Who mentors the officers?

Officers stood out in our data as a subset of the population desiring more mentoring. As a subset of a subset, this more heavily applied to senior officers. Early-career officers may receive some informal guidance, possibly in the form of an informal “rudder steer,” as this major\(^{21}\) said in reference to lieutenants, “We’re all juggling metaphorical balls, right? Some of them are glass. Some of them are rubber. We allow the lieutenants to drop the rubber balls. We make sure that we’re there to catch the glass ones.”

Informal guidance aside, some officers in this sample stated that they received less formal mentoring from senior leaders than appears to occur among enlisted Marines. Formal mentoring was often viewed as synonymous with counseling, which officers in this sample said is rare. In an officer focus group conducted aboard MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, a major, captain, and 2\(^{nd}\) lieutenant all agreed that they had received little to no career guidance in the form of counseling or reviews\(^{22}\). The 2\(^{nd}\) lieutenant\(^{23}\) summed up his struggle, “I had to pull teeth to get my initial counseling. Like I literally had to actually pull teeth to get my initial counseling. And then I switched RSs\(^{24}\). And I’m still like, ‘Hey! I would like refinement!’” A colonel\(^{25}\) agreed, offering he had received relatively little formal guidance over the course of his career. “I probably had six counseling sessions total, from those two officers [a reviewing officer and a general officer] that equated to about three hours of time. And that would have been in about twenty-two years of service.”

The MCMP Guidebook states, “This mentoring program is intended to replace the counseling program. The counseling program focused on duty performance and was primarily structured for the junior Marine. The mentoring program is intended to encompass all aspects of every Marine’s life” (p. 6, emphasis added by authors). This quote suggests that counseling was intended to be directed toward the development of junior Marines’ job skills, which might explain why these officers have lacked counseling in their careers. However, the quote also

\(^{21}\) Major (#126), Male, Interview, MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, 091917.
\(^{22}\) Mixed Sex Officer Focus Group, MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, 091817.
\(^{23}\) 2\(^{nd}\) Lieutenant (#620), Male, Mixed Sex Officer Focus Group, MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, 091817.
\(^{24}\) Reporting Senior
\(^{25}\) Colonel (#617), Interview, Male, MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, 091817.
suggests that the Corps has made moves to expand mentorship and guidance beyond junior job development and to include those who are not junior within the fleet. In the case of these officers, however, these changes have borne no substantial fruit.

Rethinking Mentorship – Challenges and Successes

The Marines thus far have described how they were disappointed by leaders who were incapable or incompetent as mentors within their units (to be sure, many had good experiences cultivating mentor-mentee relationships within their units, but this report highlights the negative experiences to show the potential blind spots of the unit-hierarchy model of mentorship). On the other hand, Marines in our sample also described positive experiences with choosing – and in some cases being – unlikely mentors. The following stories illustrate how the rigid leadership hierarchy that otherwise defines the military does not necessarily define who is a good mentor.

The bias against certain forms of “reverse mentorship”

Reverse mentorship is the mentoring of an individual with more experience or status by a junior member of an organization. In the Marine Corps, it is not uncommon for someone of higher rank – namely, new officers – to have less experience than senior enlisted Marines. Officers, no matter what their experience, are higher ranking than enlisted, but it is common knowledge that the gunnery sergeant is the backbone of the Marine Corps because of their experience and advisory capacity.

For example, a Marine officer described her mentor: a female gunnery sergeant who taught at Officer Candidate School. The officer admired the enlisted Marines’ command presence and her ability to keep everyone in line. According to the 2nd lieutenant, her mentor was known for “coming up with the worst burns. Like she made me feel terrible! [chuckles] Like, she could just tear you up!” But in addition to being demanding, the gunnery sergeant could be empathetic. The 2nd lieutenant recalled what the gunnery sergeant did during one of their runs where another officer candidate was falling behind:

And so, there are people turning on [the officer candidate]. And we were out for a particular run, and this girl was falling back, you know. This was like third run this week, and she’s falling back, falling back, falling back. And instead of just laying into her, like all the other gunnery sergeants and our officer were doing, this gunnery sergeant turned around, slowed down the whole squad, turned around, and started looping, like looped back, and got her, and had her lead, and like kept getting her. Every time she’d fall back, she’d make all of us run with her and make all of us get her to go. It was the first time I’d ever heard a sergeant instructor say anything positive to anyone and was like, “Come on. You played basketball in college. This is all mental. You can do this.” And started motivating her. And to me that was really awesome.

But while young officers are meant to learn and be mentored by experienced enlisted Marines, other types of reverse mentorship, such as if junior enlisted were to mentor more senior

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27 2nd Lieutenant (#125), Female, Interview, MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, 091817.
enlisted or officers, are viewed as out of place or as fraternization. Contrast the 2nd lieutenant’s story with this “unsanctioned” form of reverse mentorship. This lance corporal\(^{28}\) described how he was helping higher ranking Marines learn their jobs when others in his unit told him that a lower ranking Marine could not do that:

I had been in my job for a year, and I had corporals and a sergeant who had come, and they’ve only been there for three months. So, like I was still kind of teaching them how to do their job and everything like that. Then they said, “Hey, we’re picking mentors.” There was three Marines who were like, “Hey, we want Lance Corporal [name removed] to be our mentor for the job.” And they – the NCOs – told them, they’re like, “You cannot have a lance corporal as a mentor.” And I kind of talked to them, and I was like, “Isn’t the idea of mentoring supposed to be like person-to-person, not Marine-to-Marine?” And they- my whole entire opinion was shut down. I was kind of like, “All right, whatever.” And I, off the book, taught them how to do everything they need to do to be a successful Marine.

Although higher ranking Marines wanted the lance corporal as their mentor, they were told this was unacceptable. Since rank does not automatically signify experience, mentoring relationships across ranks is consistent with an experience-based approach to mentoring. Promoting mentor-mentee choice beyond the unit-hierarchy paradigm might encourage and normalize reverse mentoring and maximize the potential for younger Marines to disseminate experience-based knowledge to Marines of all ranks. Of course, this must be done with caution, so as not to impair the “good order and discipline” ideally instilled in young Marines through watching their leaders direct and mentor their subordinates. Moreover, it must not impinge on the operational necessity of leaders being able to command their subordinates without being questioned.

Finding someone “like you” or someone you like

As seen in the 2nd lieutenant’s OCS story above, command presence and leadership skills can be just as important as job-related knowledge for some Marines when choosing a mentor. Relatedly, personality is an important factor when choosing a mentor. In the case below, an NCO\(^{29}\) chose a master gunnery sergeant outside of her MOS as her mentor, in part because of their shared values and similar personalities. This sergeant, who felt overlooked by her male counterparts and lacked trust with the leaders in her unit, recounted:

\begin{tabular}{ll}
Interviewer: & Okay. When you said one of them is actually your mentor, is that because you chose that person? Or is that a- \\
Sgt: & Yes, I chose him. He actually- he sits in the back [of the office suite]. So, he’s actually a part of the band. So, he’s not one of those people that falls into a like little clique, I guess. \\
Interviewer: & Okay. Why- is that why? Because he’s an outsider? \\
Sgt: & A little bit, but we also have very similar personalities. So, if I were to walk down the hall and somebody was jacked up [in their uniform appearance], I would immediately correct it. He’s kind of that same character type. So, we just- we vibe really well. \\
\end{tabular}

\(^{28}\) Lance Corporal (#137), Male, Focus Group, MCAS Yuma, 092617.  
\(^{29}\) Sergeant (#601), Female, Interview, Pentagon, 090617.
Another case in which personality was a factor was when young Marines sought advice from their recruiters, even after entering the fleet. Given that Marine recruiters are screened and trained to “own our mission by taking care of our people,”\textsuperscript{30} they may personify qualities that attracted young individuals to the Marine Corps in the first place. In the case of this lance corporal\textsuperscript{31} who, like the sergeant above, also distrusted the leadership inside his unit, his recruiter, a “chill guy,” seemed like a viable option when he needed advice:

Interviewer: So, is that something that you feel like you have a relationship just like– is he somebody that you trust and feel comfortable talking to?

LCpl: Actually, I don’t know him that much. Like I said, I was in the recruiting phase for not even a month before I went out to recruit training. So, I honestly don’t know him that much. All I know is that he is a cooler guy. I don’t know, I guess [chuckles]. I’ve talked to him before, but he’s just a more of a chill guy. And obviously, he’s a staff sergeant, so he knows more. So that’s why I called him. And he kind of helped me.

These two enlisted Marines exhibited initiative by asking for mentorship directly rather than relying on the unit-based model of senior leader mentors. Promoting a broad approach to mentorship that permits Marines to define what they want and from whom is likely to rely on and simultaneously reinforce Marine initiative.

**Flawed Role Models**

Role models are not necessarily perfect. First-hand cautionary tales from early mistakes can also be useful. In fact, these types of “lesson learned” stories are easy to find among prominent Marine leaders. For instance, in his Passage of Command speech, former Marine Commandant Robert B. Neller expressed regret at setting fire to range two at Camp Hansen as a young lieutenant,\textsuperscript{32} and on his book tour, retired General Mattis has recounted mistakes he made with the media when he was the commanding officer in Iraq. Implicit in these stories is that certain mistakes determine neither the character nor the career of a Marine. Weak, biased, or uninterested leadership, however, can shape both, especially for Marines who are new to the fleet. There is no formula for a perfect leader, and the same goes for a perfect mentor. Many of the Marines we interviewed reported that a good leader is one who is human and does not purport to be flawless. However, there seems to be a line between endearing fallibility and behavior that undermines Marines’ trust and confidence in a leader.


\textsuperscript{31} Lance Corporal (#019). Male, Interview, MCB Camp Lejeune, 082217.

Same Sex Mentors or Not?

In the case of women in our sample, biological sex was a limiting factor in choosing mentors, sometimes with negative results. This was especially the case when women were expected to mentor or be mentored by other women in their unit, which is commonly the case. Female participants who had the opportunity to choose mentors inside or outside their unit were often satisfied with their choice. In a few cases, it appeared that men also benefitted from female mentors (see “Should women be empathy coaches?” below). While women in this sample were comfortable with male mentors, a few men were not as comfortable mentoring females. That said, female Marines considering or experiencing motherhood received some benefit from merely seeing other mothers who were advanced in their careers, regardless of whether they were advised by them. Same-sex mentorships may work out well for men who, by virtue of sheer numbers, have more mentoring choices within their unit. However, for women, due to the very limited numbers, the relationships may be more forced, and in those cases, the outcome can be damaging.

Should women be empathy coaches?

Some men enjoyed mentoring women because they perceived them to be different from men. One chief warrant officer believed that women “feel emotion better,” which he believed to be critical to good leadership. He also touched on a more subtle dynamic: whether men feel comfortable speaking to women about personal matters. In this case, he welcomed communication that was emotional, whether or not it was from a man or woman: “Ladies allow themselves to feel emotion better. So, I find that I have to dig a little deeper in the fellas. One, let them understand it’s OK for them have emotions, especially when bad stuff happens, like when family dies.”

In a focus group, a major said she was dubious of the assumption that she has more empathy, but nonetheless she was grateful that one of her leaders valued empathy:

[O]ne of the better leaders I worked for, and he was really upfront. ... [H]e’s like, “I don’t really work with a lot of women.” He’s like, “I struggle with empathy.” He’s like, “Maybe you can help me balance that.” Like, he saw the value that, I guess, maybe my gender brought. I don’t know, but apparently, I am supposed to have a whole bunch of empathy that would solve it. But that’s what he saw when he looked at me, and, you know, he was really- I appreciate his honesty about it. Well, he’s trying, you know. You just don’t get that. You don’t even get the impression that people are trying with that at all.

Regardless of whether all women are inherently better at empathy, the assumption that they are might be the grounds for unlikely, diverse, and fruitful mentorship relationships.

Complexities with female-female mentorship pairs

In a hyper-masculine organization (the Marine Corps was only 7% female at the time of this study) same-sex mentorship for women comes with challenges that same-sex mentorship for men

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33 We also realize that choice in mentorship is important for men. However, we focus on women in this paper because our data show that women’s choice is more frequently limited by bias and assumptions.
34 Chief Warrant Officer 2 (#616), Male, Interview, MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, 091817.
35 Major (#201), Female, Focus Group, MCB Quantico, 090617.
does not. The assumption that women are the best mentors for other women leaves female Marines with limited options for mentors and even fewer (and perhaps none at all) when looking only within their unit.

As discussed above, value alignment is an important part of mentorship, and shared sex does not automatically equate to shared values and life experience. Many women reported choosing mentors on the basis of shared values as opposed to shared sex. In fact, the lance corporal\textsuperscript{37} whose NCOs sidelined her based on her failed quadcon run did not seek advice from a female NCO in her unit precisely because of the NCO's private behavior, which she felt conflicted with Marine Corps values.

\[Y\]ou're supposed to have a higher standard for yourself. Because you're entrusted to protect like everyone around you. And so, I don't go out and like go to raves and like wear a bra and underwear around, covered in glow-in-the-dark paint. Like, that's just not what I do. Like I know who I am as a Marine. Like, I don't know. I think that's where the stigma comes from! Because I think I do it too. Where like you see a female who wants to have some fun, and then they try to go back to work, and you're like, "You just did this over the weekend."

The lance corporal had already concluded, perhaps hastily, that she and the NCO did not share the same leadership values. Likewise, in the case of the following lieutenant\textsuperscript{38}, she and her mentee did not have shared values, and this was a problem:

\[T\]he schoolhouse said, "This female sergeant has had behavioral issues in the past. She needs a positive female role model. We'll put them on the same team." And I, after the fact, was like, "Okay, but this female sergeant is tatted up, dips, vapes, and drives a monster truck." And there's no way that she's going to be like, "Oh, yay! A liberal [name of university removed to protect participant] graduate female!" Just because we're the same gender doesn't mean that I can mentor her.

In the 1\textsuperscript{st} lieutenant's experience, leadership assumed she would be an effective mentor because she was mentoring another woman. This is a common error, according to a staff sergeant\textsuperscript{39} who stated, "and that's what a lot of leaders overall don't understand. Like, just because I'm a staff sergeant doesn't necessarily mean that I'm gonna make the right choices for these female Marines."

What unites these and other women is that they do not see their sex as a determining factor in a successful mentorship, even though their leaders may. Many women also expressed a hesitancy to associate with other women, as the stereotyping that women in the Corps inevitably face\textsuperscript{40} might make it a risk to associate with other women.

Further, many women have had negative experiences related to their sex and, thus, do not always feel as though they can sincerely encourage the career of other women in an organization where they themselves do not always feel seen or protected. This was the case with a corporal,\textsuperscript{41} who reported being sexually assaulted by a Marine in her unit but was reportedly told by the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{37} Lance Corporal (#624), Female, Interview, MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, 091917.
\bibitem{38} 1\textsuperscript{st} Lieutenant (#326), Female, Interview, MCB Camp Butler, 101917.
\bibitem{39} Staff Sergeant (#043), Female SCNO Focus Group, MCB Camp Lejeune, 082317.
\bibitem{41} Corporal (#309), Female, Interview, MCB Camp Pendleton, 091417.
\end{thebibliography}
prosecutor, “We know that it happened. ... We just can’t prove it.” With her alleged assaulter off to recruiting school, she remained at the unit where her faith in her senior leadership had been shaken by the way the assault had been handled. Her leaders, in turn, were asking her to mentor women who were checking into the unit, reportedly saying, “This is the time for you to really like take them under your wing like you’ve been doing with the other [male] Marines, but maybe like with the females some more.” The corporal continued:

I don’t know what that means. I kind of feel like it means, “Even if things don’t go your way, make sure that the Marines stay classy like you and don’t make a big fuss about it.” And I wanted to scream and tell them to go fuck themselves! But I’m [laughs] classier than that. And so, I nodded my head, and I said, “Yes, sir.” And I don’t know what I’m going to do about those female Marines, and I want to empower them and make them feel like they need to be like me, and they need to stick up for what they think is right. But at the same time, I’m not sure that they’re as strong as I am and they’re going to be able to handle the reprisals and the repercussions and the consequences that are going to come from them acting like me.

We cannot know exactly what her leadership was asking or thinking. It is possible that this corporal’s senior leadership views sexual assault as a problem women need to avoid rather than one that men need to prevent and that this is why they asked her to mentor the incoming women. Another possibility is that her leadership is simply under the impression that women are automatically better mentors for women. For several reasons, one of which is discussed in more detail below, men are often hesitant to mentor women. Whatever the case, this corporal was hesitant to mentor these women – even though her leadership thought it would be a good idea – because, in her estimation, telling them to “stick up for what they think is right” might put them at risk for negative consequences and reprisals.

Organizational impacts of the “women mentor women” mentality

Women being encouraged to mentor other women can be frustrating on a personal scale, but now that they are entering previously restricted MOSs and MOSs that have not typically had many women, some women’s careers are being impacted based on the assumption that women are needed to “build a landing zone”42 for other women. The intention to build a landing zone is well-meaning, according to this captain43 who heard General Brilakis give a brief about “priming the pump” for women in the aviation community. The captain also perceived the effort to be highly effective:

I can offer up an example of how it works. So like females in aviation. So we got a brief from General Brilakis when he was manpower, came [to the] postgraduate school to talk to us. He was explaining how they “primed the pump.” He was like, “The reality is they lowered standards initially to get women into aviation. That just was what it was.” He was saying it had to do with like, they weren’t prepped for it before. The women who joined the military weren’t offered the opportunity to go to aviation. So you didn’t have a whole lot of people who were like, “Oh, I want to be a pilot.” It was just suddenly like, “Hey, we’re going to allow women in aviation now.” Later, you get the ones who were like, “I’m gonna be a fucking

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42 Corporal (#221), Female, Interview, MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, 091817.
43 Captain (#105), Male, Captain, Officer Focus Group, MCB Quantico, 090617.
pilot.” And so they really crushed it all through whatever their training pipeline was up to that point. And so you get rock stars, no issue.

Others, like these officers in one focus group[^44], saw shuffling women among MOSs as a hollow gesture rather than an empowering and effective strategy:

**Lt A:** What is the minimum threshold that we think is a good appropriate number [of women] to have? You know, do you want to send one captain to be the first female in a battalion by herself with a staff sergeant who doesn’t even work in her section, so they can’t develop a good working relationship in preparation for SOI to drop off, you know, six girls?

**LtCol B:** And, oh, by the way, that captain is not going to be their company commander.

**Lt A:** Exactly! She’s in a completely different-

**LtCol B:** It doesn’t matter. She just happens to be in the battalion.

**Lt A:** Yeah. She is a literal check in the box. Like, the way we’re doing it, it doesn’t make sense.

Furthermore, an insistence that women must be in the same unit to mentor one another will decrease female leadership in other MOSs where they once excelled. This captain[^47] explained:

Right now there’s like this mass exodus not just out of the service for other reasons, but of uniquely talented, qualified, leadership-heavy women who are never going to make it to that higher rank, or, you know, it’s just not going to- because of the way that we work as a Marine Corps, and the way that we stovepipe our communities to have excellence. It’s just the third order effect of that is that, you know, where my community used to be kind of the center of excellence for female leadership, it doesn’t exist anymore. Because they’re being [inaudible] to go out to these other places. So, that hurts my heart.

However, the other side of the same coin is that the MOSs that have a relatively significant number of women may in fact offer supportive environments for women; perhaps this is what the “landing zone” mentality is trying to facilitate. A major[^48] described how the female leadership in her communications MOS created a system of support:

And our community does, for what it’s worth, we do a good job of having kind of a network and support in our community. Which so many other communities don’t. Because we have the leadership, you know? We’ve got colonels and lieutenant colonels in our community that are prevalent. ... And so, there’s some level of mentorship you just get by being in the MOS.

As women are increasingly spread out among MOSs, being thinned out in certain MOSs and bulked up in others, the ability for them to choose among male and female mentors inside and outside their unit would be an asset to the Corps. As evidenced by these participants, the assumptions that women are better mentors to one another and that they must be in the same unit

[^44]: Mixed Sex Officer Focus Group, MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, 091817.
[^45]: 2nd Lieutenant (#620), Mixed Sex Officer Focus Group, MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, 091817.
[^46]: Lieutenant Colonel (#618) Mixed Sex Officer Focus Group, MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, 091817.
[^47]: Captain (#606), Female, Interview, Pentagon, 060917.
[^48]: Major (#322), Female Officer Focus Group, MCB Camp Butler, 101817.
to have a mentor-mentee relationship are effective in some cases, but potentially disruptive in others.

Men’s reluctance to mentor women

Some male Marines are wary of mentoring women due to fears of false rumors about a non-existent relationship and/or the concern that they will be falsely accused of sexual misconduct (a fear that may be endemic to the organization, according to our data). This can deter men from cultivating professional relationships with female Marines. Men and women alike noted this. A researcher asked a male corporal\(^{49}\) about the impact of false sexual assault accusations in the workplace:

> You know, men have become so afraid of women in the work sector that they don’t want to interact with them for fear of what could happen, you know? So, on top of that, you know, the women aren’t getting the proper training that they need. They aren’t getting “men-mentored” properly.

This “fear of women” was prevalent in our data, inside and outside of discussions of mentorship. It likely contributes to women’s sense of isolation in the Corps, a theme that appeared heavily in our data.

Relatedly, women who have male mentors discussed the need to be cognizant of the fact that others might perceive their relationship to be inappropriate. A sergeant\(^{50}\) for example, talked about how, when she was a private first class (PFC), the NCOs of her unit were unsupportive, with some even telling her that she did not belong because she was female. She often went to her OIC\(^{51}\) for work advice, seeing him as the only one who was competent. While her SNCO did not say disparaging things to her, he gave her bad pros and cons scores because of her relationship with her OIC. She recalled:

> He didn’t say those things, but he would say certain things to me that – like pros and cons, for example. In my shop I would always go talk to my OIC about work stuff because no one else in my shop knew how to do it, and I was a PFC. So, my staff NCO tried to lower my pros and cons and said that my work relationship with my OIC was unprofessional. And once my pros and cons got to my OIC, he raised them ‘cause he’s like, “I don’t understand why your pros and cons are so low. You do such a good job and you’re a well-rounded Marine.” But I mean after comments like that, I just never felt comfortable going to him. My OIC, I would have felt comfortable going to him, but at the same time I didn’t feel comfortable passing all the ranks and going straight to an officer.

The sergeant viewed her SNCO’s perception of her to have been tainted, “Just because we [she and her OIC] talked a lot, but it was all work related. I’d go to his office a lot, but that – his office was right outside our office. But I had to because nobody else knew how to do the work I was doing.” Thus, even within a unit, women have to be careful about who they choose as a mentor, as the adage that “perception is reality” might mean that a woman with male mentors is perceived to be currying special favor. Having a mentor outside of one’s unit might curb this perception. However, it is a catch-22 when a woman wants to have a mentor within her unit because she seeks to get

\(^{49}\) Corporal (#135), Male, Interview, MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, 092017.
\(^{50}\) Sergeant (#041), Female, Female Sergeants and Below Focus Group, MCB Camp Lejeune, 090617.
\(^{51}\) Officer in Charge
MOS- and unit-related knowledge from him. This points to a need, detailed in other reports\(^{52}\) on the Marine Corps Organizational Culture Research Project, to ease the institutional stigma that women are dangerous, promiscuous, and to be avoided.

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<th>The Case for Male Advocates</th>
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| Male advocates (also called allies) are men who stand up for women and help foster an environment in which women are seen as equals. Arguments about how women should be respected *simply because they are human* aside, a “stamp of approval” from a well-liked man can shift male perspectives on women. Male mentors can also be protectors against biased men, as was the case for this female major\(^{53}\):

> Because there weren’t women to do it, and so these are men who saw me, saw that I had some sort of quality that they wanted to have stick around the Marine Corps, and very much advocated for me [tapping table for emphasis] over and over and over again because there were other men who really didn’t want me there.

Male advocates are important for both quantitative and qualitative reasons. Men vastly outnumber women in the Marine Corps, and so men are essentially required for there to be any substantial numerical presence on the female empowerment front. Qualitatively, men can be particularly effective in combatting bias against a female minority because, unlike women, they do not constantly face biases that undermine their opinions and perspectives.\(^{54}\)

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<th>Mothers as mentors</th>
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| Another possible reason some male Marines in our sample were uninterested in mentoring women is because they do not share certain experiences that are exclusive to the female body. None of the women in this sample mentioned this as an issue for them in having male mentors. However, they did express a desire to talk to, or even see, more mothers who were Marines. Marines who are mothers face a negative stigma in the Marine Corps, including from other women, as one corporal\(^{55}\) who had a c-section explained:

> I had another female be like, “Oh, I beat her in the run today.” I’m like, “Okay, what’s your excuse? Because you didn’t stick out a kid! Like, you should be physically fit! You had nothing to like hinder your ability.” So, it’s like “Why wouldn’t you have my back? And, you know, help me? Versus be like, ‘Ha! I beat her.’” And we’re the same rank. Like, what the heck? That’s why I think we fall through too. We don’t have anyone’s support.

Even though this corporal did not feel any support from within her unit, she was inspired when she attended a Women’s Leadership Symposium\(^{56}\) a few days prior to our interview and saw that there were senior enlisted women with several kids.

\(^{52}\) See, for example, Lane, Rebecca, Tarzi, Erika, Post, Kristin, Gauldin, Eric. (2018) “Marines’ Perspectives on Various Aspects of Marine Corps Organizational Culture.” Available at: [https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1079774.pdf](https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1079774.pdf)

\(^{53}\) Major (#207), Female, Interview, Pentagon, 090717.


\(^{55}\) Corporal (#634), Female, Interview, MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, 092017.

\(^{56}\) This symposium took place at MCAGCC Twentynine Palms on September 15, 2017. Both authors attended.
I mean, I'm sure, in the past twenty years or so, that they must have been through like all the wars and everything. I know they've definitely gotten crap for having kids. But they're still making it.

This ability to see a higher-ranking mother who has been able to progress in her career appears to be important to Marines of various ranks. One lieutenant colonel who was up for promotion decided to retire instead because she had no examples of higher-ranking women who were mothers:

I don't want it anymore. I have a family now. And I'm well-aware that the Marine Corps doesn't value families. They don't. And especially not female officers who have families. I mean, look at what we have! We have two female general officers. Both unmarried, no children. Both that carry themselves and act in ways that are not stereotypically feminine. And one of them I worked for! I worked for General [name removed] before! I know her! I love her. But you know what? I don't resemble her in any way. My life doesn't resemble her. I [laughs under breath] physically don't resemble her.

As one lieutenant colonel succinctly put it, "I just want one general officer to stand up and say, 'It's okay to be a mom.'" In our prior reports, we have discussed additional prejudice and stigma that women face. But a common theme, and one that the corporal and the lieutenant colonel referred to, is the impact a baby has on a female's body and, therefore, her career as a Marine. As one 2nd lieutenant explained:

[R]ight now, it's like the time where I should be thinking about getting married, having children, and that piece. But I don't know how it's gonna affect my career. Just 'cause we have all these physical tests we have to take. And like to feed and raise a baby.

This is a topic she would like to discuss, but at her current duty station in Okinawa, it is difficult for her to find a mother to ask inside or outside her unit. This is one area of mentorship that is highly sex-related, though it is not necessarily solved by same-sex mentoring, as all female Marines do not have children, and not all mothers are automatically adept at mentoring others mothers. However, it is evident that merely seeing other Marine mothers as role models, whether or not they are in the same unit, has an impact on women's sense of belonging and validates their experiences in the Corps.

Conclusion and a Humble Suggestion

When Marines in this sample described a mentor or potential mentor, they tended to describe an individual whom they wanted to emulate. This applies to mothers who saw other

57 Lieutenant Colonel (#603), Female, Interview, Pentagon, 090617.
58 Lieutenant Colonel (#901), Female Officer Focus Group, MCB Quantico, 090617.
60 2nd Lieutenant (#271), Female, Interview, MCB Camp Butler, 101917.
Marine mothers making it, a male sergeant\textsuperscript{61} who looked up to a female peer because “she’s a really, really great person,” a captain\textsuperscript{62} who admired “a badass Marine” colonel, and a major\textsuperscript{63} whose enlisted Marines “were always hysterical – they always made the best out of a bad situation” on deployment. While a single mentoring formula, let alone definition, is not possible, those Marines who found positive mentorship relationships had success in finding them both within the traditional unit-hierarchy and by reaching outside of that structure. The latter was especially true for Marines whose identity factors (permanent or temporary) set them apart from the majority of the unit, including mothers and other women. It should also be noted here that while issues of ethnicity and mentorship did not immediately stand out in our data, a more in-depth analysis might reveal connections between participants’ self-reported ethnicities and their relation to their experiences with mentorship. Because identity does play a factor in mentorship, it is likely that non-white Marines also benefit when they find mentors outside of their unit, especially when units are not ethnically diverse.

In our interviews, we found that the impact of no or poor leadership within the unit often meant a lack of mentorship. While not surprising, it does give weight to the idea that mentorship decoupled from unit leadership allows Marines access to a wider pool of potential role models. When given that freedom, Marines did not choose their own leaders, their own sex, their own rank, or any other commonality by default. They instead defined categories that were important to them: shared values, shared experiences, career knowledge, or respect and admiration. Similarly, Marines do not seek just one type of mentor; some want career advice, others inspiration, and still others refinement (physical, occupational, leadership, or otherwise). Nor do they necessarily seek just one mentor for all things. Marines are already defining what kind of information is important and who is best able to mentor them. The Marine Corps as an institution can facilitate that by encouraging their initiative and rethinking messaging that, overtly or not, defines mentors by their location (the unit) rather than their function (the benefit to the Marine). While, of course, we do not suggest doing away intra-unit mentorship, we do suggest that increased promotion and facilitation of mentorship choice beyond unit will greatly benefit Marines and the organization as a whole.

\textit{A Humble Suggestion}

So how can choice-beyond-unit be facilitated? Although firm recommendations are beyond this report’s purview, we believe that holding more events in which Marines with similar and dissimilar backgrounds and experiences can learn, listen, socialize, and even just see each other might expand the mentorship aperture for Marines. For women, this is particularly important. The nature of Marine demographics means that women are rarely in a group with several other women, except for their time in boot camp, OCS, and one-off organized events and within some MOSs. These experiences can be empowering, particularly when “exceptional leaders” are present.

We were able to attend the previously mentioned Women’s Leadership Symposium while conducting fieldwork at MCAGCC Twentynine Palms. The symposium brought together the majority of the women on that base in one place for a day of working groups and panel discussions. Many of the attendees were surprised there were so many women aboard the installation, as they do not see

\textsuperscript{61} Sergeant (#042), Male, Interview, MCB Camp Lejeune, 082317.
\textsuperscript{62} Captain (#610), Female, Interview, MCB Camp Pendleton, 091217.
\textsuperscript{63} Major (#126), Male, Interview, MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, 091917.
each other on a day-to-day basis. Further, some noted that it was inspiring to see not only peers but also more senior Marines who had made their way through the ranks while also having families. It dawning on one lance corporal, after seeing women who had successfully advanced in the ranks, that it was possible to find a mentor outside of her unit, “if you need higher-ups that are females to trust.” Another lance corporal also attended this symposium and described the experience as a “breath of fresh air” that made her “wish that we had a staff NCO that we can like look up to. And to see what to do in our line of work. Like a role model on who to become or how to present ourselves.” As we stated earlier in this report, women are not necessarily better mentors to women. However, in some cases and for some women they are, and in an organization that consists mainly of men, finding that female mentor can be difficult. In addition to seeking male mentors inside and outside of their units, events such as the Women’s Leadership Symposium might provide some “sight” where the unit-hierarchy model of mentorship has left many in a blind spot.

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64 Lance Corporal (#223), Interview, MCAGCTwentynine Palms, 091917.
65 Lance Corporal (#624), Interview, MCAGCTwentynine Palms, 092017.